CentrePiece Vol. 12 No. 1 by Centre for Economic Performance,
C e n t r e Pi e c e
ISSN 1362-3761
Immigrant identity in Britain
When central banks talk
Educational controversies
Teaching values
Trade winners and losers
Blair’s economic legacy
The Magazine of The Centre for Economic Performance Volume 12  Issue 1  Summer 2007
MICROSOFT’S
MARKET 
POWER
As one prime minister hands over to his
successor, there is much talk about the
legacy of the former and the challenges
facing the latter. As a contribution to this
evaluation of past and prospective policies,
the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
is producing a new series of policy analyses
around some of the defining slogans of
New Labour: the priorities of ‘education,
education, education’; the goal of ‘making
work pay’; and the desire to be ‘tough on
crime, tough on the causes of crime’.
The first is available on our website –
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/briefings/default.asp –
and more will follow on these and other
topics during the course of the transition
to the new regime. Here, CEP’s director
John Van Reenen provides a broad
overview of Tony Blair’s economic legacy.
One thing is for certain, he concludes:
over the next two or three years, Gordon
Brown will not have the luxury of being
able to blame the policy mistakes of a
previous government for any unfortunate
economic news.
CEP also plans to take stock of its own
performance, looking back at some of the
big ideas that have emerged from the
research and the stories of their
subsequent impact on both scholarship
and public policy. For example, studies of
the causes and consequences of
unemployment and inequality in the 1980s
and 1990s not only changed the way
economists think about these problems,
they also led to the development of labour
market policies like the New Deal and the
minimum wage – and later, following their
implementation, to evaluations of their
effectiveness.
In the meantime, in this issue of
CentrePiece, we showcase findings from all
six of our major research programmes –
labour markets; education and skills;
productivity and innovation; globalisation;
macroeconomics; and wellbeing.
Two articles look at current controversies in
education: the effects on pupils’
achievement of attending a grammar
school or a religiously affiliated school.
Among the others, CEP researchers
question if there really is a potential ‘clash
of cultures’ in modern Britain; explore the
effects of openness to trade; examine how
markets react to monetary policy-makers’
words and deeds; and call for schools to
teach values.
And our cover story focuses on a 
product – Microsoft’s Windows software –
with which we are all familiar but 
whose ramifications are often obscure. 
A government’s policies on technology and
competition rarely have the public
prominence of its policies on education,
work and crime, but the consequences can
be equally significant.
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The antitrust cases against Microsoft in the United States and
Europe have been the most high profile implementation of
competition law in the last 20 years. Christos Genakos, Kai Uwe
Kühn and John Van Reenen look at the key economic issues,
notably what they imply for the conduct of competition policy in
high-tech industries dominated by rapid innovation.
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I
n the various Microsoft cases,
antitrust authorities in the United
States and the European Union
(EU) took on one of the most
valuable companies in the world
and its CEO Bill Gates, the world’s richest
man. After five years of investigation, in
March 2004, the European Commission
held Microsoft guilty of abuse of its
dominant market position under Article 82
of EU law and imposed the largest fine
ever for such an antitrust violation in
Europe: €497 million. 
The Commission found that Microsoft
had abused its monopoly of personal
computer (PC) operating systems in two
ways: ‘deliberately restricting
interoperability between Windows PCs
and non-Microsoft work group servers,
and by tying its Windows Media Player, a
product where it faced competition, with
its ubiquitous Windows operating system.’
(Work group servers are computers that
allow people to share files and printing,
store and protect large amounts of data,
access the internet, etc.)
The Commission also demanded major
remedies, including compulsory licensing
of intellectual property: ‘within 120 days,
to disclose complete and accurate
interface documentation which would
allow non-Microsoft work group servers to
achieve full interoperability with Windows
PCs and servers’; and ‘within 90 days, to
offer to PC manufacturers a version of its
Windows client PC operating system
without Windows Media Player.’ 
This degree of intervention is highly
unusual and has led to a continued
conflict about the implementation of the
remedies. The case also raises an
important question about the conduct of
competition policy in high-tech industries
dominated by rapid innovation.
Market power
In the server case, which we focus on
here, the Commission’s basic argument
was that Microsoft extended its market
power from PC operating systems (of
which Windows controls over 95% of the
market) into a complementary market –
that of the operating systems for work
group servers. How did it do this?
For server operating systems to be
effective, they must be able to
communicate easily with the PC operating
system – what is known as ‘efficient
interoperability’. Microsoft’s control of the
PC operating system meant that it could
limit the efficient interoperability between
Windows and rival companies’ server
operating systems by manipulating the
interfaces responsible for connecting
Windows with other software. 
The Commission argued that Microsoft
had both short-run (‘static’) and long-run
(‘dynamic’) incentives to ‘foreclose’ rivals
from the server operating systems market
in this way. The dynamic reasons are
The European
Commission
versus Microsoft:
competition policy in 
high-tech industries
probably most important, as Microsoft was
clearly concerned that a strong presence
of rivals in server operating systems could
threaten the profits it enjoyed from its
Windows monopoly of the PC market in
the future.
For example, customers could reduce
their reliance on PCs by running
applications like spreadsheets, database
management and banking software mostly
on servers, leading to a decline of
Microsoft’s longstanding monopoly. By
extending the Windows platform
dominance from PCs to servers, Microsoft
could extinguish this future threat.
Various internal emails by Microsoft
senior executives suggest that this strategy
was not the overzealous imaginings of
Eurocrats. For example, in 1997, Bill Gates
wrote: ‘What we’re trying to do is use our
server control to do new protocols and
lock out Sun and Oracle specifically… the
symmetry that we have between the client
operating system and the server operating
system is a huge advantage for us’.
This may have just been cheap talk,
but as Figure 1 shows, Microsoft’s share of
the server operating systems market did
rise dramatically during the late 1990s:
from about 20% at the start of 1996 to
over 60% in 2001. By this point, Novell,
the combined UNIX platforms (IBM, 
Sun, etc.) and Linux could muster only
about 10% each in market shares. The
Commission argued that at least some of
Microsoft’s swift rise to power was due to
anti-competitive actions.
There has been much debate over
whether Microsoft was dominant in the
work group server market. But the key
issue in a ‘leveraging’ case like this is
whether Microsoft had power over PC
operating systems. Given their 95%-plus
market share, even Microsoft’s lawyers did
not try hard to contest this point.
Economic incentives to
foreclose
So did Microsoft have an economic
incentive to foreclose competition through
leveraging? The key question is as follows:
when firm A, the monopolist (Microsoft in
PC operating systems), faces firm B in a
complementary market (server operating
systems), in what circumstances will firm A
exclude firm B from the adjacent market?
Microsoft’s essential argument rested on
the Chicago School view that a
monopolist does not have incentives to
monopolise a complementary market since
all profits can be extracted at least as
effectively by increasing the price of the
monopoly product. 
The Chicago argument – known as the
‘one monopoly profit theory’ – is that
degrading interoperability would cost
Microsoft lost revenues as consumers would
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not be willing to pay as much for a
Windows operating system due to its lower
performance with non-Microsoft servers.
Instead of going to the expense of
monopolising the new market through
reducing rivals’ quality, Microsoft could
simply charge a higher price for its PC
operating system and extract all the profits
from the server market in this way.
Consequently, the Chicago argument is that
Microsoft must have benign reasons, such
as its desire to end the excessive profits
earned by other server vendors or the
superior efficiency of Windows technology.
The modern economic theory of
foreclosure suggests many reasons why
this critique might break down. In
Microsoft’s case, it is useful to distinguish
between dynamic and static incentives.
Dynamic incentives to
foreclose
The lack of any long-run incentive to
foreclose in the ‘one monopoly profit
theory’ arises from the assumption that
the monopolist has a permanent
unchallenged position with no threat of
future entry to the primary market. This is
unlikely to hold for Microsoft’s position in
the PC operating systems market.
Although in the short run it was
protected by strong barriers to entry, in
the longer run, there were a variety of
threats to Microsoft’s juicy stream of
profits. Consumers care about the
software applications (spreadsheets, word
processors, games, etc) that are written on
a particular operating system. The main
competitive advantage of Windows is the
wide range of applications written on its
platform (software developers write
programs to work on the most popular
platforms). But major platform threats
emerged in the late 1990s associated with
the growth of the internet.
One threat was that increasing
numbers of applications could be delivered
through servers. Server operating systems
Figure 1:
The growth of Microsoft’s share in the work group server
market 1996-2001
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
20
01
 Q
3
20
01
 Q
1
20
00
 Q
3
20
00
 Q
1
19
99
 Q
3
19
99
 Q
1
19
98
 Q
3
19
98
 Q
1
19
97
 Q
3
19
97
 Q
1
19
96
 Q
3
19
96
 Q
1
■ Win/NT
■ Unix
■ Netware
■ Linux
■ Other
S
h
ar
e 
of
 t
h
e 
m
ar
ke
t
By degrading the ability
of rival server operating
systems to work with
Windows, Microsoft
‘foreclosed’ the market
The Commission's
remedy for foreclosure
was to ask Microsoft to
reveal information to
enable server vendors
to connect properly
with Windows
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typically run on open standards, so
software developers could use these
standards rather than Windows. This
meant that the server operating system
could become a potential non-Microsoft
platform, directly challenging the
stronghold that Microsoft had created on
PC operating systems. If applications only
needed a slimmed down version of a PC
operating system, customers would not
need to buy expensive Windows
upgrades.
Effectively, a platform based on a
server operating system could have
become a potential competitor for the
Windows operating system. One way to
prevent this danger was for Microsoft to
monopolise the server market – even if this
meant sacrificing profits in the short run.
The key idea in dynamic foreclosure
theory is that an action that shifts short-
run market share can have long-run
benefits to the monopolist through
depressing rivals’ incentives to invest and
innovate. In many cases, these arguments
may be suspect as there is no obvious
mechanism whereby this could take place.
But in Microsoft’s case, the mechanism is
clear and well established due to the
‘applications network effect’. Shifts in
share towards Microsoft in the server
market (current and expected) will mean
that developers start switching away from
writing to non-Microsoft platforms.
Customers will shift away from rivals
because there are fewer applications and
this will further reduce developer’s
incentives to write software. This
applications network effect makes
foreclosure arguments much more
plausible than in other industries.
Static incentives to foreclose
The dynamic arguments for foreclosure
work even though, in the short run, the
monopolist may suffer some losses. But
these arguments are even more
compelling when there are short-run
incentives to foreclose. One such incentive
is the ability to price discriminate more
effectively in the monopoly market 
(PC operating systems) by dominating 
the complementary market (server
operating systems). 
In Microsoft’s case, imagine that there
are two types of customers: large firms
(which are less sensitive to the price of the
PC operating system) and small firms
(which are very sensitive to the price of
the PC operating system). A monopolist
would like to charge a high price to the
large firms and a low price to the small
firms. Microsoft finds this hard to do
because the large firm can always pretend
to be a small firm.
But imagine that large firms also place
a high valuation on a complementary
product (servers), whereas small firms do
not because the gains from sharing
computing resources are much smaller. In
this case, by monopolising the server
market and charging a higher price for the
PC and server operating systems bundle,
Microsoft is able to extract more profits.
Our research provides empirical evidence
that these short-run incentives exist and
that they have grown stronger over time. 
Remedies
Software markets are fast moving and
highly innovative: many new economy
advocates have argued that European
competition law is inadequate in such
markets. In particular, Microsoft argued
that the proposed remedies of forced
disclosure of interoperability information
would have a severely negative effect on
innovation, as it would lead to the
wholesale cloning of Microsoft’s valuable
intellectual property. Whatever the
supposed short-run gains, they argued
that the long-run costs in terms of lower
innovation by Microsoft would swamp
these purported benefits.
These are difficult areas as the
Commission was under no legal obligation
to consider the effects on innovation,
despite their economic importance.
Nevertheless, the Commission argued
that: ‘a detailed examination of the scope
of the disclosure at stake leads to the
conclusion that, on balance, the possible
negative impact on Microsoft’s incentives
to innovate is outweighed by its positive
impact on the level of innovation of the
whole industry’.
To assess this claim, we must
investigate the Commission’s remedies and
their likely impact on innovation incentives
on Microsoft, on its rivals and therefore on
the market as a whole. The Commission
asked Microsoft to reveal information
necessary to allow rivals to interoperate
with the Windows platform. This amounts
to a compulsory licensing remedy. The
Commission conceded that Microsoft
could charge a reasonable fee for such
licenses, reflecting the intellectual property
embedded in the information.
There is an important distinction
between demanding information to
enable interoperability compared with
imitation. The Commission wants the
former to enable other firms to connect
to Windows in the same way telecom
There are many reasons
for believing that the
remedy could have a
positive effect on
industry-wide innovation
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regulators force fixed line incumbents to
share their network with mobile phone
operators, even if the incumbent also
offers these services.
If the remedy allowed imitation – for
example, a complete copy of the key
security features of the PC operating
system – there would be a stronger
concern over innovation. Consequently,
the remedy did not require release of
Windows source code – Microsoft’s 
‘crown jewels’. 
Interestingly, Windows source code is
not what the rival server vendors
wanted. Instead, they were after a
detailed technical description of the
interfaces to enable them to design 
their own code to interoperate with
Windows. Microsoft’s description of 
the remedy as allowing cloning is
therefore inaccurate. 
The impact on innovation
incentives
What are the likely effects of the remedy
on industry incentives to invest in
research and development (R&D)? For
Microsoft’s rivals, there are two effects:
■ Having interoperability information
increases the value and sales of their
products. This will increase rivals’ returns
to R&D, as any innovation will be spread
over a larger number of units sold. The
remedy essentially reduces Microsoft’s
tax on rival innovation and should
increase incentives to innovate.
■ Rivals no longer have to incur costs to
overcome technical barriers to
interoperability created by Microsoft’s
disclosure policy. Overcoming such
barriers is innovation of a sort, but it is
duplicative and socially wasteful.
There are several potential effects 
of the remedy on Microsoft’s incentives 
to innovate:
■ First, with better disclosure, rivals will be
able to compete on a level playing field.
To the extent that this reduces the
expected market share and increases
price competition from now higher
quality rival products, the remedy may
lead to some reduction in Microsoft’s
incentive to invest. But unlike its rivals,
Microsoft will still obtain substantial
profits from general innovation in the PC
operating systems market, where it will
continue to enjoy a monopoly. There is
therefore little reason to expect that
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate on
operating systems solutions would
substantially fall.
■ A further effect may also contribute
strongly to increased innovation
incentives. Through innovation, a firm
can escape harsh competition with rivals
and secure profits for a transitory period.
This effect will tend to increase the
investment incentives of all firms,
including Microsoft. Economic research
is somewhat ambiguous on the net
impact of all of these effects, but on
balance, it is believed that intensifying
competition will usually lead to increased
innovation.
■ Finally, Microsoft may change the quality
as well as the quantity of its R&D. There
could be positive effects on quality
because Microsoft will no longer have
incentives to block innovations that raise
quality but have high interoperability
with non-Microsoft servers. There is
some evidence that Microsoft has
sacrificed its own innovative potential to
protect the Windows desktop monopoly.
This was known within Microsoft as the
Windows ‘strategy tax’ – the need 
to close down research lines that,
although leading to innovative 
products, could potentially weaken the
lock-in of Windows. 
In summary, there are likely to be
positive effects on rivals’ innovation from
the remedy and ambiguous effects on
Microsoft’s incentives. While the eventual
outcome is uncertain, it is far from clear
that the remedy will reduce industry-wide
innovation. On the contrary, there are
many reasons to believe that it could have
a positive effect on aggregate innovation.
Interoperability at what
price?
Following the Commission’s decision, the
most contentious issue has been the
conditions under which the interoperability
information should be licensed and 
what information was necessary to achieve
full interoperability. The Commission left
the exact conditions out of its initial
decision because it involved intricate review
of technical information, which was
delegated to an independent 
monitoring trustee.
Microsoft’s initial suggestions were
unacceptable to the industry, the
Commission and the independent
monitoring trustee appointed to oversee
the remedy. Microsoft proposed that the
interface information could only be
Competition policy can deter
anti-competitive behaviour
without the need for ever
taking legal action
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purchased as one bundle and specified a
license fee for each rival software copy
shipped in the order of magnitude of the
Microsoft software itself. This would have
clearly continued the exclusionary effect
simply through high prices.
Many industry insiders doubted that
any innovation of significance was
embedded in the interfaces themselves.
They argued that just changing the
language of the interface would not be a
substantive innovation that had material
value and that therefore it should not 
be compensated.
Indeed, to the extent that Microsoft
has innovation embedded in processes
that use the interfaces, such innovations
should not matter for the assessment of
the license fee because the interfaces
themselves do not constitute the
innovation. Typically such information in
other software sectors is licensed at only
nominal fees.
Another contentious issue was the
amount and type of information that
Microsoft had to provide. To interconnect
with Microsoft’s software, rivals needed
information about how exactly the
interface works. When the trustee found
that Microsoft was not giving sufficient
information to make this possible, the
Commission stepped in with a ‘statement
of objection’ and eventually a further large
fine for non-compliance. But this tug-of-
war has led to considerable delay in the
effective implementation of the remedy.
Conclusions
What more general lessons can be learnt
from the Microsoft case about antitrust
enforcement in high-tech markets and
elsewhere? First, it is worth remembering
that the case has gone on for nine years
with four statements of objections issued
and still no final resolution. This is partly a
reflection of the complexity of the
technical issues, the legal necessity of 
due process and Microsoft’s financial
strength. Many of its server rivals have
long since died.
An obvious problem is that the legal
timescale is so long compared with the
rapid evolution of these markets. By the
time a remedy is in place, the marketplace
has moved quickly beyond the problems
over which the case was fought: even if
the judgement and remedy are
appropriate, is it ‘too little too late’? 
In our view, the Commission’s decision on
Microsoft has had some impact since it is
prospective and hence gives the
Commission power over future versions 
of Windows.
Although caution is always warranted
before intervention, antitrust authorities
cannot take a completely laissez faire
approach to innovation markets. Much of
the positive impact of competition policy is
through deterring anti-competitive
behaviour without the need for ever
taking legal action. And since software
markets are replete with examples of
similar issues, the case may have
contributed to higher deterrence against
anti-competitive exclusionary behaviour.
A second observation concerns the
status of foreclosure theory. Part of the
Commission’s case was an explicit
consideration of economic incentives and
an analysis of the effects of the remedy on
innovation. These are clearly important
from an economic perspective, even
though European legal practice is often
ambivalent about getting into these issues.
Despite the difficulty of bringing
empirical evidence to bear, consideration
of innovation and foreclosure was
unavoidable in making a credible
economic case. One of the challenges
facing modern economics is to develop
guidelines for the type of empirical
evidence that could be used to test the
likelihood of foreclosure being a problem
in different markets.
The Commission has been much
criticised in its use of foreclosure theory in
merger cases. For example, the proposed
merger of General Electric and Honeywell
was blocked after it had been cleared by
the US authorities, only for the judgement
(although upheld) to be severely criticised
by the Court of First Instance in 2005.
And in 2002, the Court actually
overturned the Commission’s blocking of
the Tetra/Sidel merger in 2001, which was
based on ‘over-speculative’ theories.
In a sense, foreclosure theory in a
merger case is inherently speculative.
Opponents of the merger must produce
arguments that a particular type of
foreclosure behaviour is more likely to
occur as a result of the merger, although
there are no exclusionary practices in the
pre-merger situation.
The evidential position is better in an
abuse of dominance case because the
exclusionary behaviour is already alleged
to have happened, so there can be an
empirical discussion over whether the
behaviour has in fact occurred, whether it
could be justified in terms of efficiency,
and whether there has been any material
effect on the marketplace as a result of
this behaviour. This was the case with
Microsoft where evaluation was possible.
Furthermore, Microsoft’s exclusionary
mechanisms were lent credibility by the
internal emails, the kind of evidence that
is rarely seen.
Unfortunately, although foreclosure
may be easier to detect in a case over
abuse of monopoly power compared with
a merger, remedying the problem is much
harder. In a merger, there is always the
clear choice of simply blocking the
proposed transaction. Remedies for an
existing monopolist are harder to frame
and even harder to enforce.
The Commission and Microsoft have
been wrangling for a long time over the
terms of the disclosure remedy and it is
still not perceived to be effective.
Microsoft’s main rivals have reached out of
court settlements, so the concern may be
that smaller firms and potential new
entrants could be the main parties to
suffer. We are unlikely to have heard the
end of this case.
This article summarises ‘The Incentives of a
Monopolist to Degrade Interoperability:
Theory and Evidence from the Personal
Computer and Server Market’ by Christos
Genakos, Kai Uwe Kühn and John Van
Reenen, CEP mimeo, and ‘Some Economics of
European Commission versus Microsoft’ by
Kai Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen,
forthcoming in Cases in European
Competition Policy: The Economic 
Analysis edited by Bruce Lyons (Cambridge
University Press).
Christos Genakos, a research associate in
CEP’s productivity and innovation
programme, is at Cambridge University.
Kai Uwe Kühn is at the University 
of Michigan. John Van Reenen is director 
of CEP.
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Culture clash 
or culture club?
The identity and attitudes of
immigrants in Britain
Does Britain face a real threat from immigrants
and minorities – particularly Muslims – who
refuse to think of themselves as British? 
Alan Manning and Sanchari Roy have
analysed data on the national identity and
values of both immigrants and British-born
people – and they conclude that fears of a
‘culture clash’ are seriously exaggerated.
M
any people in
Britain consider
immigration to
be one of the
most important
issues facing
the country today. Their concerns seem to
be as much about the social impact of
immigration as its economic impact, which
economists typically conclude are small. It
is not entirely clear what social
consequences of immigration are feared –
sometimes it is simply the dilution of
‘traditional’ culture; sometimes it is a more
melodramatic fear that Britain is becoming
a mix of mutually incompatible cultures,
whose irreconcilable differences could end
in a serious ‘culture clash’.
Of course, these concerns are not
new. For example, in April 1990, Norman
(now Lord) Tebbit cited his infamous
‘cricket test’. The former cabinet minister
told the Los Angeles Times: ‘A large
proportion of Britain's Asian population
fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do
they cheer for? It's an interesting test. Are
you still harking back to where you came
from or where you are?’ 
But the current concerns seem
heightened, largely because of fears about
the integration of Muslims into British
culture. There is widespread belief that a
growing fraction of Muslims who live (and
in many cases were born) in Britain do not
think of themselves as British, have no
aspiration to do so and do not want their
children to do so either. Instead, it is feared,
they subscribe to some other identity,
creating little enclaves that resemble, as far
as is possible, the countries from which
they came or a model of the good society
very different from what is generally
thought of as ‘Britain’.
Such fears tend to be magnified by
the statements by some British Muslims,
which appear explicitly to reject a British
identity and affirm another one. One of
the July 7 bombers appeared in a video
saying ‘your democratically elected
governments continuously perpetuate
atrocities against my people and your
support of them makes you directly
responsible, just as I am directly
responsible for protecting and avenging
my Muslim brothers and sisters’. 
The use of the words ‘your’ and ‘my’
clearly expressed the people with whom
he identified.
The problem is that most British
people know so little about Muslims that
it is very hard to know how widespread
these feelings are. Our research uses
responses from the Labour Force Survey of
almost one million individuals to the
question ‘What do you consider your
national identity to be?’ as well as data on
people’s views of their rights and
responsibilities from Home Office
Citizenship Surveys. The answers give little
support to the idea of a serious culture
clash within British society. 
The British-born
Among those who were born in Britain,
over 90% of all groups of whatever
religion or ethnicity, think of themselves as
British. In particular, there is no evidence
that Muslims are less likely to think of
themselves as British than other groups.
Our interest in this topic began with the
responses of Muslims, but we came to the
conclusion that it was unfair to single
them out for special attention as they do
not stand out in any way.
Table 1 shows the proportions of
British-born people of different religions,
who think of themselves as British. Of
those describing themselves as Christian,
99.1% report themselves as British. But of
those describing themselves as Muslim,
the proportion is slightly higher at 99.2%,
exceeded only by those who are Jewish.
Percentages reporting a British identity are
lower for Buddhists, Sikhs and Hindus, but
are above 95% for all groups. It is hard to
look at these figures and see grounds for
concern. Of course, this does not mean
that the Muslims see themselves as British
and not Muslim – it is just that they see
no conflict in being both.
Ethnicity has a somewhat larger effect
on British identity than religion, as can be
seen from Table 2. All non-white ethnic
groups report lower levels of British
identity, but this is probably because many
of them are second-generation
immigrants. If we look at young people,
those from ethnic minorities whose
parents are British-born report the same
CentrePiece Summer 2007
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Table 1:
Percentage of British-born
people reporting British 
as their national identity,
by religion (controlling 
for ethnicity)
Religion Percentage reporting 
British identity
Christian 99.1%
Buddhist 95.7%
Hindu 96.1%
Jewish 99.6%
Muslim 99.2%
Sikh 95.6%
Any other religion 97.0%
No religion 98.8%
Total 99.0%
Contrary to what many people seem
to believe, Britain is not riven 
by a large-scale culture clash
Table 2:
Percentage of British-born
people reporting British 
as their national identity,
by ethnicity (controlling 
for religion)
Ethnicity Percentage reporting 
British identity
White 99.1%
Mixed: White/Black Caribbean 97.6%
Mixed: White/Black African 95.3%
Mixed: White/Asian 95.2%
Mixed: Other 91.8%
Indian 94.2%
Pakistani 93.4%
Bangladeshi 94.9%
Other Asian 90.5%
Black Caribbean 93.5%
Black African 94.2%
Other Black 95.3%
Chinese 91.9%
Other 79.4%
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Figure 1:
Immigrants’ views of their national identity 
and years since arrival
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levels of British identity as the white
population.
There is, however, one group that
stands out as having an extremely low level
of British identity – Catholics from
Northern Ireland. From our research, it
appears that any identity conflict among
British-born Muslims is an order of
magnitude smaller than that among
Catholics from Northern Ireland.
Immigrants
So far, we have focused on people born in
Britain, but what about immigrants? The
fraction of immigrants who identify
themselves as British varies a lot by country
of birth. But there is a simple explanation
for most of this variation – how long
immigrants have been in the country? 
Figure 1 shows that new immigrants
almost never think of themselves as British,
but the longer they remain in the country
the more likely they are to do so. This
process of assimilation is faster for some
immigrant groups than others, but not in
the way that might be expected. For
example, Muslims are not less likely to feel
British than those from other backgrounds,
and immigrants from Pakistan and
Bangladesh assimilate into a British identity
much faster than the average, while those
from Western Europe and the United
States do so more slowly, with Italians and
Irish standing out as the groups that
assimilate least into a British identity.
We also find evidence that immigrants
There is no evidence that
Muslims are less likely to
think of themselves as British
than other groups
The longer
immigrants remain 
in Britain, the more
likely they are to
think of themselves
as British
from poorer and less democratic countries
assimilate faster into a British identity. Part
but not all of this can be explained by a
greater tendency to take up citizenship.
Rights and responsibilities
This last finding might lead one to argue
that whether people think of themselves
as British is not a meaningful indicator of
whether they feel they belong, nor of their
integration into British life and values.
There is little concern about the fact that
Italians rarely seem to come to think of
themselves as British because it is felt that
Italians have similar views on the way in
which society should be run.
So it is conceivable that those born in
Britain call themselves British because that
is what their passports say they are but
that they espouse a variety of diverse
values. To examine the values that may lie
behind notions of British identity, we also
conducted an analysis of people’s views on
rights and responsibilities. Our findings
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Immigrants from
poorer and less
democratic
countries
assimilate faster
into a British
identity
here are very similar to those on national
identity: immigrants are very slightly less
likely to have views on rights and
responsibilities that the popular consensus
holds to be ‘desirable’.
But the differences are much smaller
than the differences among the British-
born population of different ages and with
different levels of education. What’s more,
the immigrant groups who emerge as
having different values from the British-
born population are not the ones that
have become the focus of most public
concern. Muslims, for example, do not
have significantly different values.
These findings strongly suggest that,
contrary to what many people seem to
believe, Britain is not riven by large-scale
culture clash. This is not to deny the
existence of some people who are
prepared to use violence to further their
agenda, but our evidence suggests that
these are a tiny minority.
Our conclusion is supported by
evidence from the 2003 British Social
Attitudes Survey, which asked respondents
to say whether they agreed or disagreed
with the statement ‘Muslims are more
loyal to Muslims than to Britain’. Of the
non-Muslim respondents, only 9%
disagreed with a further 25% neither
agreeing nor disagreeing. But among the
Muslim respondents (who we might
expect to be better-informed on the
subject) 45% disagreed, a significant
difference.
The survey also found that 62% of
non-Muslim respondents thought that
there was a fairly or very serious conflict
between Muslims and non-Muslims in
Britain, compared with 27% of Muslims. 
A broader question about conflicts
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
world as a whole found 85% of non-
Muslims saying they thought that there
was a fairly or very serious conflict,
compared with only 67% of Muslims.
In presenting our research findings at
various universities, we have been
surprised by how many people react by
saying our results are all wrong and that
they ‘know’ that there is a serious culture
clash. We should be seriously concerned
that they maintain this stance even when
faced with evidence against it. While there
may not be much of a problem with
immigrants and minorities in Britain not
thinking of themselves as British, there
may be a bigger problem in the refusal of
the indigenous white population to see
these groups as British.
This article summarises ‘Culture Clash or
Culture Club? The Identity and Attitudes of
Immigrants in Britain’ by Alan Manning and
Sanchari Roy, CEP Discussion Paper No. 790
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0790.pdf).
Alan Manning is professor of economics at
LSE and director of CEP’s research
programme on labour markets. Sanchari 
Roy is a PhD student and research 
assistant at LSE.
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Sharing the fruits of trade
in brief...
One of the defining features of globalisation is increasing
openness to trade – the removal of a whole range of
barriers to the free flow of people, goods, services and
capital. Some of these trade barriers can take the form of
duties and tariffs levied at national borders. Others are
caused by standards – regulations covering labour,
environmental issues and health and safety – which differ
between countries and regions. Still others arise from
geography, for example, inaccessibility or a lack of
transport infrastructure. 
As these barriers are dismantled by economic
liberalisation, new transport networks and constant
innovation in information and communications
technologies, so the impact of trade openness on
countries, firms, regions, communities and economic
sectors is coming under closer scrutiny. 
One CEP study of the effects of new transport
infrastructure focuses on the US interstate highway
system, spanning over 40,000 miles, and mostly
constructed between 1956 and 1975. The highways had
three goals: to improve the connection between major
metropolitan areas in the United States; to serve US
national defence; and to connect with major routes in
Canada and Mexico. As an unintended consequence of
meeting these goals, the highways crossed many rural
areas, making it possible for researchers to examine their
causal impact on the local economy.
The research by Guy Michaels finds dramatic effects. 
A country where distances were long, travel was slow
and most economic activity was highly localised began to
integrate across its land mass. It soon became apparent
that the new highways had a big impact not on
passenger vehicles but on the large trucks that have
become the primary mode of cross-county commerce.
The highways increased trucking income and retail 
sales by 7-10% per capita in the rural counties they
crossed, relative to other rural counties. This suggests
that highway counties took advantage of the reduction 
One of CEP’s core research themes is the impact of trade
openness on countries, firms, regions, communities and
sectors. Two recent studies confirm the gains from
opening up trade – but recognise that addressing the
uneven outcomes of globalisation is as big a challenge as
pursuing liberalisation in the face of entrenched interests.
Success breeds success, often 
for the vast majority – but 
the fruits of commerce are not
always enjoyed by all
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in trade barriers to increase their trade with 
other counties.
More surprising perhaps are the findings on how the
highways affected the demand for skills in rural areas.
On average, the highways had no effect on the demand
for high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers.
But the highways increased the demand for high-skilled
workers compared with low-skilled workers in counties
where skills were abundant and reduced demand where
skills were scarce.
In other words, by opening new markets, the highways
disproportionately benefited high-skilled workers where
skills were abundant and hurt them where skills were
scarce. This finding is consistent with the view that trade
increases the demand for the abundant factor. 
Other CEP research on trade liberalisation – by Stephen
Redding and colleagues – sheds more light on how the
reduction in barriers to trade reallocates economic
activity. Here too, the pattern that emerges is one of
success reinforcing success. 
At the most basic level, the researchers find that a
reduction in trade barriers encourages simultaneous job
creation and job destruction in all industries, but that
gross and net job creation vary with country and industry
characteristics.
Significantly, there is a net loss of jobs in industries with a
comparative disadvantage (those where relative labour
and non-labour costs are high), while industries with
comparative advantage enjoy net job creation as job
losses due to exiting firms are exceeded by jobs created
by the entrance and expansion of high-productivity firms.
Likewise with productivity levels and average firm
output: the gains from liberalisation are greatest in
industries with comparative advantage. Interestingly, it is
in these industries that the research finds the highest
levels of 'creative destruction' of firms, which may
explain why workers in these more dynamic sectors
report higher levels of job insecurity.
That the overall effect of opening up trade is to increase
aggregate welfare is not in doubt, as both studies make
clear. As average productivity increases, so the price of
goods is driven down, reinforcing the virtuous circle. But
welfare gains are not experienced uniformly, and just as
some regions or sectors have to grapple with the
handicaps of a low skills base or high input costs, so too
do developed and less developed economies. 
Contrary to the anti-globalisers, success breeds success
not just for the few but for the many – and often for the
vast majority. But the fruits of commerce are not always
enjoyed by all. Addressing those uneven outcomes is as
big a challenge for politicians as pursuing liberalisation in
the face of entrenched interests. Most agree on the need
to ‘manage‘ globalisation. That shouldn’t mean reining it
back, but helping everyone to jump on board.
This article draws on research described in 
‘The Effect of Trade on the Demand for Skill –
Evidence from the Interstate Highway System’ by
Guy Michaels, CEP Discussion Paper No. 772
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0772.pdf)
and ‘Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous
Firms’ by Andrew B Bernard, Stephen J Redding
and Peter K Schott, Review of Economic Studies
73(1): 31-66, 2007.
Guy Michaels is a lecturer in economics at LSE
and a research associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Andrew Bernard is at Dartmouth
College. Stephen Redding is research director of
CEP’s globalisation programme. Peter Schott is at
Yale University.
Transport
infrastructure 
like the 
US interstate
highway system
increases trade
D
o announcements by the
European Central Bank
(ECB) affect market
expectations about the
future direction of its
monetary policy? And if so, how long
does it take for these messages to be
incorporated into asset prices?
Our findings suggest that when the
tone of the press conference differs from
what the market expects, there is a
sizeable and immediate reaction in the
price of three-month Euribor futures –
widely traded futures contracts based on
short-term interest rates in the eurozone –
and the complete price adjustment usually
takes no more than an hour. Therefore,
central bank communication turns out to
be a crucial and effective instrument for
steering market interest rates. 
The fact that market participants
should react to central bank
announcements is quite surprising for
academic economists, especially after the
seminal work of Kydland and Prescott
(1977). They were awarded the Nobel
Prize in 2004 for showing, in a theoretical
framework, that policy-makers face a
severe problem of ‘time-inconsistency’ –
they tend to renege systematically on their
past promises – and so it is in the public
interest to ignore their declarations.
Only 20 years ago, William Greider
published his popular book Secrets of the
Temple on the US Federal Reserve System.
At that time, it was common practice for
monetary policy to be surrounded by
secrecy. But nowadays, it is clear that
central banks increasingly emphasise
verbal communication with the markets in
an attempt to inform them of the likely
direction of future monetary policy. This is
very much the case with the ECB, which
holds all-important news conferences at its
CentrePiece Summer 2007
14
What is the minute-by-minute effect of central
bank communication on asset prices? 
New research by Carlo Rosa and Giovanni
Verga finds that the unexpected component of
announcements by the European Central Bank
has a sizeable impact on interest rate futures.
Words
market reactions when 
central banks talk
Central bank
communication
is a crucial 
and effective
instrument 
for steering
market 
interest rates
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Governing Council meetings, and it is also
increasingly true of the Bank of England
and the Fed.
But even though central bankers put
great emphasis on verbal communication,
economists have not yet systematically
studied the relationship between central
bank words and central bank deeds, and
especially not the information content of
central bank words elicited by the reaction
of financial markets. Our study is an
attempt to begin to fill this obvious gap in
the research literature.
We examine the minute-by-minute
effect of central bank announcements on
asset prices. Contrary to what is commonly
found in the literature of monetary
economics, we show that market
participants respond to two different
pieces of news rather than just one piece
of news. So in order to correctly describe
the conduct of monetary policy, we find
that two dimensions are needed: central
bank actions and, most importantly, central
bank words. 
We apply our empirical analysis to the
ECB’s communication policy because of its
unique institutional feature that on one
day, at two different points in time, the
Governing Council announces first its
monetary policy decision, and then its likely
future monetary policy stance. These events
take place in sequence. At 12:45 GMT, the
ECB communicates the new level of its
policy rate with a press release. Then 45
minutes later, at 13:30 GMT, the monthly
press conference starts and the ECB’s
president explains the monetary policy
decision to the public, as well as the
Governing Council’s assessment of current
economic developments. This speech is very
important, especially for traders, because it
conveys strong hints about the likely path
of the ECB's future monetary policy.
The use of high-frequency intraday
data rather than daily data to analyse
central bank communication is crucially
important because it allows us fully to
exploit the unique institutional feature of
ECB monetary policy conduct: we are able
to disentangle the effects of one surprise –
the monetary policy shock – from the other
– the news shock.
The advantages of using high-frequency
data are best illustrated by means of the
example in Figure 1, where we consider the
minute-by-minute movements of the three-
month Euribor futures price on a specific
Governing Council meeting day, 6 April
2006.
On that occasion, the ECB did not
change its policy rate and this was fully
anticipated by financial market participants.
In fact, there is basically no market reaction
at 12:45 (indicated in Figure 1 by the first
vertical red line). On the other hand, the
and deeds:
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Figure 1:
Futures price dynamics on 6 April 2006
Figure 2:
Monetary policy shocks: market reactions to ECB deeds 
This chart plots the difference between the new policy rate communicated at 12:45, and the one-month
Euribor rate quoted at 10:00. This quantity is normalised by adding the mean equilibrium (liquidity and
risk) spread between the policy rate and the one-month Euribor rate, in the specific case 0.11. 
The horizontal axis represents the time of the day while the vertical
axis represents the futures rate. The first red line is at 12:45 GMT,
when the ECB communicates the new level of its policy rate with a
press release. The second red line is at 13:30 GMT, the start of the
monthly press conference.
In Frankfurt, Mr Trichet
says ‘strong vigilance’ –
and traders in London
react immediately
futures rate fell sharply at around 13:50. 
It took only twenty minutes: from 
3.085 at 13:33, the futures rate fell to
2.98 at 13:56.
What explanation could there be for
this quick market response? In his monthly
introductory statement, the ECB’s president
Jean-Claude Trichet did not use the key
word ‘strong vigilance’, which seems to
indicate a strong risk of policy rate
spikes in the near future. This was a
great news shock for traders in London,
because they had expected a strong
hawkish announcement such as the
appearance of the signalling word
‘vigilance’ on their screens.
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Everything became clear when a
journalist drew the president's attention
to the matter by asking:
‘Mr Trichet, the markets were
expecting you to say vigilance in
order to prepare them or prepare for
an interest rate rise in May. You did
not say vigilance, was that
deliberate?’
To which Mr Trichet deftly replied:
‘It is our responsibility to be as clear
and transparent as possible with
market participants, investors and
savers. I would say that the current
suggestions regarding the high
probability of an increase of rates in
our next meeting do not correspond
to the present sentiment of the
Governing Council. I would also add
that the sentiment that I see from
time to time in some remarks or
market literature concerning the
perception that we do not increase
rates when we are out of Frankfurt is
equally not at all the sentiment of
the Governing Council. (…) And it is
true, vigilance is not mentioned in
the introductory remarks, as you very
wisely remarked.‘ [Emphasis added]
Although the example in the figure is
an exceptionally strong case, it serves to
illustrate an important and more general
point: the ECB is able to move asset
prices using words alone, without any
need for deeds. Obviously to maintain its
credibility, the ECB ultimately has to
deliver what it says it will, that is, to
match words with policy deeds.
In fact, to complete the story, in May
2006, there was no policy rate change by
the ECB. But at the Governing Council
meeting of June 2006, which was actually
held outside Frankfurt (in Madrid), there
was a policy rate increase of 25 basis
points, as Mr Trichet fully signalled to the
public in the April press conference.
The second main finding of our
research is that central bank
communication can affect asset prices
permanently as well as transitorily. 
But it took around three years for traders 
to learn not only how to interpret ECB
announcements but also to believe in 
them fully.
In this regard, it is revealing to see 
the changing pattern over time as displayed
in Figure 2, which plots the difference
between what the ECB does and what the
market expects the ECB to do.
Nowadays, market interest rates
respond only very marginally to ECB deeds
because the current decision is completely
expected most of the time and thus already
priced in. Indeed, the true reaction takes
place when the president himself makes
statements, especially when their content
differs from what the market expects, as
shown in Figure 1. Nevertheless, changes in
the ECB policy rate had a significant effect
in the first years of the bank’s life when the
public was still in a learning phase.
We conclude by reiterating that central
bankers’ announcements are a very
powerful tool in driving market
expectations and even possibly in driving
the evolution of the real economy.
This article summarises ‘The Impact of
Central Bank Announcements on Asset Prices
in Real Time: Testing the Efficiency of the
Euribor Futures Market’ by Carlo Rosa and
Giovanni Verga, CEP Discussion Paper No. 764
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0764.pdf).
Carlo Rosa is a research fellow at Ente Luigi
Einaudi in Rome and an associate in CEP’s
macroeconomics programme. Giovanni Verga
is a full professor of economics at the
University of Parma.
Further reading
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977),
‘Rules rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, Journal 
of Political Economy 85(3): 473-91.
Carlo Rosa (2006), ‘Central Bank
Communication: The Case of the European
Central Bank’, PhD thesis at the London
School of Economics.
Carlo Rosa and Giovanni Verga (2007),
‘On the Consistency and Effectiveness of
Central Bank Communication: Evidence from
the ECB’, European Journal of Political
Economy 23(1): 146-75.
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Market interest rates 
now respond only very
marginally to ECB deeds,
more often to ECB words
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Happiness 
and the teaching of values
A major purpose of schools must be to help
develop good and happy people – especially 
at a time when growing numbers of children 
are suffering from emotional disturbance.
Richard Layard argues that we need a new
cadre of teachers specifically trained to teach
values and the ways to happiness.
E
ver since I first read
Jeremy Bentham, I
have been convinced
that the best society is
one with the greatest
happiness and
(especially) the least misery. I have become
even more convinced of this since modern
neuroscience has shown that happiness
and misery are objective phenomena and
that what people say about themselves
provides a great deal of evidence about
what they actually feel.
So what do people say? It is not very
encouraging. Despite huge increases in
living standards, people in Britain, Japan
and the United States report themselves
no happier today than people did 50 years
ago. Moreover, a variety of studies of
depression and anxiety disorders in
different countries suggest that these
problems have probably increased in
prevalence.
Evidence for Britain certainly indicates
big rises in emotional disturbance. For
example, the proportion of 16-year-olds
with serious emotional problems rose from
10% in 1986 to 17% in 1999 (Collishaw
et al, 2004). A study based in the West of
Scotland showed similar changes over that
period (West and Sweeting, 2003). And
the latest research by Stephan Collishaw
and his colleagues, which covers the
whole country and comes right up to
2006, shows that things have continued
to worsen.
So what is going on? In the most
careful study of patterns of happiness,
economist John Helliwell has used four
waves of the World Values Survey done in
46 countries over the last 20 years. He
takes as his ‘dependent variable’ the
average happiness in a country and
explains 80% of the variance by six
variables, four reflecting ethical values: 
■ The perceived trustworthiness of
individuals.
■ The trustworthiness of government and
the courts.
■ The community involvement of
individuals.
■ The divorce rate.
Individualism and 
the fall in trust
I want to focus particularly on the
trustworthiness of individuals. Each
survey respondent is asked ‘Do you think
most other people can be trusted?’ The
proportions saying ‘yes’ vary enormously
and are highly correlated with the results
of a Reader’s Digest experiment, which
left wallets in the streets of different
countries and then counted the number
of wallets returned to their owners. Trust
is very high in Scandinavian countries,
and this helps to explain why these
countries generally come out as the
happiest countries in surveys. 
Similar findings about personal
decency emerge from a survey that asked
11-15-year-olds ‘Are most of your
classmates kind and helpful?’ 70% or
more said ‘yes’ in Scandinavian countries,
but the figures were considerably lower
for some other countries: 53% in the
United States, 46% in Russia and 43% in
Britain (UNICEF, 2007).
The sad fact is that in Britain and the
United States, there has been an
extraordinary fall in trust since 1960:
from roughly 56% of the population
trusting most other people to only 30%
today. Levels of trust in Britain are
particularly low among young people:
only a quarter say ‘yes’ when asked if
they trust most other people (Park et al,
2004). By contrast, there has been no fall
in trust in any other European country
since 1981 when the data were first
collected. My explanation of this is the
huge growth of individualism in the
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It should be an
explicit aim of each
school to train
character and provide
moral education
United States, which has washed across
the Atlantic like a tsunami, hitting 
Britain first and the rest of Europe much
less, so far.
By individualism, I mean the view that
a person’s main goal should be to make
the most of themselves or, more vulgarly,
to be as successful as possible compared
with other people. Put that way, it is of
course a zero-sum game, and if that is
what people value, there is no way our
society can become happier. To do that,
we have to move to a positive-sum game
in which we each care positively about
the well-being of others.
Learning the ways to
happiness
How can we do this? I think it requires an
educational revolution in which a central
purpose of our schools is to teach young
people about the main secrets of
happiness for which we have empirical
evidence. Among these ‘secrets’, I would
include:
■ If you care more about other people
relative to yourself, you are more likely
to be happy (Lyubomirsky et al, 2005).
■ If you constantly compare yourself with
other people, you are less likely to be
happy (Schwartz et al, 2002).
■ Choose goals that stretch you, but are
attainable with high probability 
(Nesse, 2000).
■ Challenge your negative thoughts, 
and focus on the positive aspects 
of your character and situation
(Seligman, 2002).
These are not exactly novel thoughts. They
are, if you like, the ‘perennial philosophy’,
but rigorously established by modern
psychology. The first principle is about
compassion to others; the others are
about compassion towards yourself. The
principle of compassion for others cannot
of course be based on self-interest – if it
is, it will fail. Rather, it has to be realised
through deliberate cultivation of the
primitive instinct of empathy, which is
latent to a varying degree in each of us.
These principles may seem obvious but
they are not easy to put into practice.
Learning hard things takes an enormous
effort. How can we expect people to learn
to be happy without massive amounts of
practice and repetition? Good parts of
traditional religions (especially Buddhism)
involve just such practice, but what
institutions do we have today that can
play this basic role?
I believe it can only be done by
schools. Parents of course are crucial. But
if we want to change the culture, the
main organised institutions we have under
social control are schools. So what should
they do? Though I was once a school
teacher, I certainly don’t have a complete
answer, but let me first report two
suggestive experiments and then draw out
some general principles.
The Penn Resiliency Project
The first example is one of a number of
programmes designed to build character,
which have been subjected to controlled
trials. The Penn Resiliency Project was
designed by Professor Martin Seligman,
the founder of ‘positive psychology’. In it,
15 11-year-old students spend 18
classroom hours on such issues as
understanding their own emotions and
those of others, and developing concern
for others. They are taught by one teacher,
who has been trained in the method
through eight hours of online self-study
and 10 days of face-to-face training.
The programme has now been
evaluated in 11 different studies and,
except in one school where the training
was inadequate, it has reduced the rate of
teenage depression over the next three
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For every subject –
including the teaching
of values – we should
know from controlled
trials what teaching
methods work best
years by on average one half. It has also
reduced bad behaviour by one third
(Reivich et al, 2005).
I believe this programme is an object
lesson in how our educational system
should develop. It has always amazed me
how little the scientific method is applied
in the classroom, except perhaps in the
teaching of reading and number. In the
last three years, I learned a lot about the
results of psychological therapy, all of
which are based on controlled trials – and
I have become even more amazed at the
scarcity of proper evaluation in education.
If something as sensitive as
psychological therapy can be scientifically
evaluated, surely the same should apply to
classroom education? For every subject,
we should know from controlled trials
what teaching methods work best. And
this applies as much to the teaching of
values as to anything else.
The other lesson that emerges from
the programme is the importance of
detailed and systematic training of the
teachers. As has been found with
psychological therapy, the effectiveness of
a given teacher will vary enormously
according to how well they have been
trained. We no longer need to rely on the
inspired amateur.
Of course, controlled trials are one
thing; delivery on a large scale is another.
Having read these findings, it seems to me
worthwhile to introduce the programme
on a large scale in Britain. Compared with
small-scale controlled trials, when half the
children are excluded, large-scale delivery
to every child in a community should have
bigger effects per child because each child
taking the programme would interact with
other children who had also taken it.
If this applied to all the children in a
city, it should be possible to modify the
whole youth culture of that city. I was
therefore thrilled that the very imaginative
local authority of South Tyneside has
decided to implement the programme in
all its schools, while Manchester and
Hemel Hempstead are using it in a dozen
further schools. The Department for
Education and Skills (DfES) are paying for
a full-scale evaluation.
If the programme is as successful as
we expect, we hope it can contribute
significantly to the first year curriculum 
for Personal, Social and Health Education
(PSHE) in secondary schools, and can 
then be followed by programmes with
older children.
Values schools
The second experiment began in West
Kidlington primary school in Oxfordshire
and has now been copied in at least a
dozen state primary schools that call
themselves ‘values schools’. The basic aim
is to give the children control of their
emotions by familiarity with uplifting 
ideas and the practice of silent reflection
(Farrer, 2000)
The school has adopted 22 key value
words – words like ‘honesty’, ‘hope’ and
‘respect’ – each taking a turn as the ‘word
of the month’, with which teaching and
discussion continually connect. Silent
reflection is practised daily at the end of
school assembly, and at the beginning of
most classes. The key question children are
asked is ‘What am I like when I most like
myself?’ Ancillary questions are ‘What
makes me happy?’ and ‘How can I make
other people happy?’
Four principles of reform
With these two practical examples in
mind, let me offer four principles that
should govern the role of schools in
character-building.
First, it should be an explicit aim of
each school to train character and provide
moral education. Teachers should stand
for clear values and, when asked about
moral questions, should make clear what
they believe. It is not enough to treat
moral issues as interesting topics for
debate. It is more important to train up
the emotions that support moral action
than the intellectual skills involved, though
of course both matter.
Second, each secondary school should
have specialists in PSHE (or, as the subject
might more appealingly be called, ‘life
skills’). And while the whole school should
reflect the values taught in PSHE, there
must be full-time professional leadership.
It is no good having it taught mainly by
part-timers without specialist training,
though they can certainly help. This is one
of the most difficult subjects to teach, and
most people who teach it should have
taken it as a specialism in their training.
Without a cadre of specialist teachers
acting as standard bearers of the
movement, there is no chance of the
educational revolution we need.
Third, there is no chance of success
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unless the movement is grounded in
science. We live in a scientific age, and,
although pockets of fundamentalism
remain, only science can and should
persuade the young about the routes to a
happy society. Now for the first time we
have in positive psychology a science that
provides the underpinning for morality
and personal liberation.
Fourth, the curriculum should
include: managing your feelings; loving
and serving others; appreciating beauty;
love, sex and parenting; work and money;
a critical approach to media; political
participation; and moral philosophy. The
DfES has been active in curriculum
development in this area, and the SEAL
programme (social and emotional aspects
of learning) is well-grounded, with
excellent materials at primary school level.
But what I am proposing is something
more campaigning and more high profile.
We need a government commitment to
producing a major specialism in this area,
with a serious teacher training
programme. Moreover, PSHE should
continue up to age 18, and include
projects that are graded by the school. It
should also feature in the head teacher’s
report for every university applicant.
Do we need it and 
can we succeed?
Clearly I am talking about a movement of
moral reform. Do we need it, and can it
succeed?
Let me remind you where we started. I
think we have a pretty good society
compared with most that have existed.
But we have not become happier in the
past 50 years. We have made enormous
progress in the mastery of nature but
none in the mastery of ourselves – and if
we want to make further progress in well-
being, it has to come mainly from the
latter. If we think we cannot afford the
time because of the threat of global
competition, we had better take an
introductory course in economics.
On top of that general case, there is
the specific worry these days about young
people. Concerns about their behaviour
has led to the Prime Minister’s ‘respect’
programme, which so far has been more
repressive than preventive. What I am
suggesting would contribute significantly
to prevention – and there is serious
scientific evidence that young people are
becoming more disturbed. 
So what are our chances of success?
Some people would say they are weak.
Some programmes in schools focused on
particular problems like drugs have had
little success though there is some
evidence that wider programmes based on
the whole ethos of the school are more
effective (Bonell et al, 2007; Weare and
Gray, 2003).
But I am talking about something
bigger than a programme; I am talking
about the reversal of a major cultural
trend towards increased consumerism,
increased inter-personal competition and
increased interest in celebrity and money. 
Many people assume that cultural
trends go on in the same direction forever.
But that is not my reading of English
history. I see something more like cycles:
increased Puritanism in the sixteenth
century giving way to increased licence
from around 1660; then from around
1830, increased Puritanism again and the
growth of Victorian values; and in the
twentieth century, again increased licence.
So why not in the twenty-first century a
shift away from ‘anything goes’ – or at
least a shift towards a more
compassionate society?
But how plausible is the education
system as the main catalyst of change?
Well, it has been so in the past.
Universities played a major role in the
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We need to create a
profession of fully trained
PSHE teachers, giving
evidence-based teaching
that changes lives
Puritan revolution of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and Thomas Arnold
of Rugby did more than anyone to convert
the middle classes to Victorian values.
Today, more people spend more of their
life in the education system than ever
before – so it is the natural catalyst for
change. 50% of young people say that
their main ambition is to be happy: it’s 
the most commonly stated ambition and
very sensible too (Park et al, 2004). Let’s
help them.
I have no doubt that new institutions
will also develop for adults. In California,
the psychologist Paul Ekman has
suggested chains of ‘compassion gyms’,
where you train your mind in compassion,
just as you train your body in the physical
gym. I also hope that the churches will do
more to help people train their minds in
the mental disciplines that we know can
lead to serenity and compassion.
But from a public policy perspective,
we must start with schools. This is a good
moment. People are worried about young
people from many angles. We have good
tools with which to help them. The key
need is to create a profession of PSHE
teachers, who give evidence-based
teaching that changes lives, and that goes
on to 18.
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Faith primary schools:
better schools or better pupils?
Government policy in many countries now favours policies
based on incentives, governance, increased choice and
competition. In England, this idea has come to be linked to
the expansion of the faith school sector because it
symbolises choice and diversity in the education system, it
embodies the kind of practice in admissions and
governance that policy-makers wish to promote, and –
crucially – it offers, so many people claim, higher
educational standards.
Arguments for expansion of the faith sector are usually
supported by evidence of higher average levels of
achievement in religiously affiliated schools compared with
the secular sector. But the fact that we observe higher
attainment in the faith sector has little bearing on the
advantages offered by moving a ‘typical’ secular school
pupil into the faith sector. This is because pupils currently
attending faith schools are not ‘typical’.
Pupils studying at religiously affiliated schools differ from
pupils in secular schools along several dimensions, many of
which – such as family background – are correlated with
their academic achievement. These differences arise in part
because the parents and pupils who choose faith schools
may have different preferences and attitudes towards
education; and in part because faith schools may have
operated some forms of ‘covert’ selection in their
admissions procedures.
in brief...
Average levels of pupil achievement in religiously
affiliated primary schools seem to be higher than in 
the secular sector. Research by Stephen Gibbons and
Olmo Silva examines whether faith schools really are
better or if their pupils are just different.
Religious
affiliation has 
little impact on a
primary school’s
effectiveness at
teaching core
subjects
In our research, we investigate whether faith schools really
raise pupil attainments more than other schools, or
whether they simply enrol pupils with characteristics
conducive to faster educational progress. We also try to
understand whether any beneficial impact of attending a
faith school comes from its religious affiliation or from
specific governance arrangements.
To answer these questions, we consider pupils at the end
of their primary schooling in England, when they have
reached the age of 11. We make use of a large census that
includes information on pupils’ past and current
achievements, school type and characteristics, place of
residence (postcode) and schools attended. 
Using this information, we compare the test results of 11
year old pupils who attend faith primary schools with those
of pupils in secular primary schools with similar abilities (as
measured by their achievement at the age of 7) and who
seem to have similar preferences and family background –
in particular because they live in the same street or block
of housing and because they go on to attend the same
secondary school.
In addition, we compare the attainments at the age of 11
for secular and faith primary school pupils who exhibit
similar levels of commitment to religious schooling through
their choice of secondary school. 
The highlights of our research results are that:
■ Faith primary schools only offer a very small advantage
over secular schools in terms of test scores at the age of
11 in mathematics and English. Moving a ‘typical’
secular school pupil into the faith sector would push him
or her up the test-based pupil rankings by less than one
percentile.
■ Any benefit of attending a faith primary school is linked
to the more autonomous governance arrangements that
characterise ‘voluntary aided’ schools (such as control
over admissions procedures). Pupils in religiously
affiliated schools that broadly fall under the control of
the local education authority – that is, ‘voluntary
controlled’ schools – do not progress faster than pupils
in secular primary schools.
■ All of the apparent advantage of faith school education
can be explained by unobserved differences between
pupils who apply and are admitted to faith schools and
those who do not. Pupils who do not attend a faith
primary school up to age 11 but attend a faith
secondary school thereafter perform just as well at age
11 as those who attended a faith primary school but
then attend a secular secondary school.
On the basis of this evidence, it seems clear that whether
or not a primary school is religiously affiliated has little
bearing on its effectiveness in educating children in core
curriculum subjects.
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Any benefit of
attending a faith
primary school 
is linked to their
more autonomous
governance
arrangements
This article summarises ‘Faith Primary
Schools: Better Schools or Better Pupils’ by
Stephen Gibbons and Olmo Silva, Discussion
Paper No. 72 from the Centre for the
Economics of Education (CEE) at CEP
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp72.pdf).
Stephen Gibbons and Olmo Silva are both
CEE researchers and active members of
CEP’s wider research programme on
education and skills.
CentrePiece Summer 2007
26
more academically orientated, general
education.
Specifically, we consider the
consequences of a reform that affected
access to grammar schools in Northern
Ireland, when England is used as the
comparison group. The two regions of the
UK differ in that the grammar school
system has been retained in Northern
Ireland whereas it was gradually
dismantled in England in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
The hallmark of the grammar school
system is that children are selected on the
basis of measured ability at the age of 10
or 11 whereas in the comprehensive
system, children of different abilities are
educated in the same schools. The
‘selective aspect’ of the education system
is currently under review by the new
administration in Northern Ireland.
Although the education systems of
England and Northern Ireland are also
different in other respects (for example,
the schools in the latter are mostly
segregated by religion), there are
important similarities. The two regions
have broadly the same curriculum and
they have the same examinations for
students at the ages of 16 (GCSEs) and 18
(A-levels).
The important considerations for our
research are that the examinations are
comparable across the two regions and
that the reform only occurred in one of
them. That reform consisted of widening
access to the more academic track within
Northern Ireland at the time of the ‘open
enrolment’ reform in the late 1980s. This
is the only differential change that
happened across the two regions.
Our research shows that the reform
enabled a very significant increase in the
number of Northern Irish pupils who could
attend the more academic track (grammar
schools) at the end of primary school,
between the pre-reform birth cohort
What are the overall effects on educational
attainment of widening access to the more
academic track? Research by Eric Maurin and
Sandra McNally investigates using the ‘natural
experiment’ of the grammar school system in
Northern Ireland, which has survived long after
its dismantlement in England.
I
t is difficult to know whether
widening access to schools that
provide a more academically
orientated, general education
makes a difference to average
educational achievement. Although there
has been a shift in this direction in many
OECD countries, reforms have been
difficult to evaluate because they are 
often accompanied by other important
changes to the educational system or
because they have been introduced at the
same time everywhere so there are no
comparison groups.
But the consequences of such reform
are deeply controversial and very much a
current policy issue. In particular,
opponents argue that increasing access to
the more academic track harms the quality
of education for everyone without
improving the prospects of those able to
attend the academic track. 
Our research makes use of a unique
‘natural experiment’ to identify the net
effects on overall educational outcomes of
widening access to schools that provide a
Widening access to
grammar schools:
the educational impact 
in Northern Ireland
Widening access to 
the more academic track
can generate positive 
net effects
(children born in 1978) and the post-
reform birth cohort (those born in 1979).
By comparing educational outcomes in
Northern Ireland and England before and
after the reform, we can identify the effect
of widening access to the academic track
on overall educational attainment. 
Using administrative data before and
after the reform, we find that the open
enrolment reform of 1989 (which affected
the 1979 birth cohort) had a clear impact
in Northern Ireland relative to England. A
15 percentage point increase in the
number of pupils enabled to attend
grammar school (at the age of 11) was
accompanied by shifts of similar magnitude
in the number achieving five or more
GCSEs at A*-C and one or more A-level.
This suggests a strong causal effect of
expanding the more academic track on
overall educational achievement.
Just before the reform, there was a
change affecting admissions in a qualitative
way. Up to 1988, girls and boys were
assessed in different categories so that the
same percentage of entrants to the
admission test would obtain a given grade
(determining whether or not they could be
admitted to grammar school). Following a
high court ruling in June 1988, this
practice was discontinued and from then
on, girls and boys were assessed together
(affecting grammar school intakes in 1989,
the 1978 birth cohort).
This change was to the advantage of
girls since they outperformed boys on the
verbal reasoning tests that were the basis
of selection. The one-year gap between
this qualitative change to admissions and
the open enrolment reform generated
significant upward and downward shifts in
the relative proportion of girls enabled to
attend grammar school across the cohorts
born between 1977 and 1980.
We find that these shifts have been
followed by parallel shifts in girls’
subsequent relative outcomes at the ages
of 16 and 18. This confirms the
considerable effect of grammar school
entry on educational outcomes using a
different source of identification to that
used for comparing outcomes over time
between England and Northern Ireland.
We also replicate this latter analysis for
boys and girls separately and confirm our
earlier results.
Thus, whether we compare girls and
boys within Northern Ireland or make
comparisons by gender between Northern
Ireland and England, it is clear that
grammar school reforms have a strong
impact on educational outcomes.
Furthermore, the design of the educational
system – in this case, the mechanism of
entry into grammar schools – has
consequences for gender differences in
educational outcomes.
As well as considering the overall effect
of expanding the academic track on
educational outcomes, we are able to use
the same experiment to consider whether
the selective system is a contributory factor
to observed inequalities between socio-
economic groups with regard to later
educational outcomes. Specifically, we can
analyse the effect of the reform according
to whether children are eligible for free
school meals, which roughly corresponds
to families in the bottom quarter of the
income distribution.
We find that there were big differences
before and after the reform between the
probabilities of lower-income groups
entering grammar school and achieving
good educational outcomes at the ages of
16 and 18. The reform had an equal
impact on children with and without free
school meals in terms of entry to grammar
school and educational achievement at the
ages of 16 and 18.
Hence, we conclude that grammar
school attendance had no less effect on
relatively disadvantaged pupils than it had
on more advantaged pupils. Therefore, the
barriers that make it difficult for children
eligible for free school meals to enter
grammar schools in the first place (such as
lower test scores at the age of 11 because
of lower parental resources) have a long-
term effect on inequality due (in part) to
the lower probability of children on free
school meals entering grammar school.
Although this research cannot be
interpreted as evaluating the overall effects
of a comprehensive or selective (‘tracked’)
system of education, it is an example of
where widening access to the more
academic track has generated positive net
effects. It illustrates the high price that
pupils pay for being excluded from the
academic track, even when they are some
way down the ability distribution within
their birth cohort.
The study also provides clear 
evidence that selection into the more
academic track really has a causal impact –
the improvement in educational 
outcomes is not simply an artefact of 
the selection process. 
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This article summarises ‘Educational Effects
of Widening Access to the Academic Track:
A Natural Experiment’ by Eric Maurin and
Sandra McNally, a forthcoming Discussion
Paper from the Centre for the Economics of
Education (CEE) at CEP.
Eric Maurin is research director at the École
des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in
Paris and professor at the Paris School of
Economics. Sandra McNally is a CEP
research fellow and CEE’s deputy director.
When more pupils were
able to attend Northern
Irish grammar schools,
overall educational
attainment increased
Grammar school attendance
had no less effect on
relatively disadvantaged
pupils than on more
advantaged pupils
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in brief...
The economy is probably the most successful legacy of
the Blair years. Ironically, New Labour’s economic policies
have been set by his heir, Chancellor Gordon Brown. 
Britain has enjoyed 15 years of continuous growth
combined with low inflation. The labour market has
absorbed a large number of new entrants, especially from
the wave of migration from Eastern Europe, yet
unemployment has remained at historically low levels.
Even on the Achilles’ heel of productivity, Britain has
narrowed the gap with her major competitors and kept
up with the American productivity miracle.
So why does Labour have trouble converting these
economic gains into the political currency of popularity?
Leaving Iraq aside, forgetfulness, fiscal policy and fairness
are the main reasons. 
First, the public appears now to take economic prosperity
for granted. People seem more likely to give credit for
success to the Thatcher reforms, to the Bank of England,
to being outside the euro or to cheap Chinese imports
than to the government. With the exception of
globalisation, however, these
were policy choices of the
government. Independence of
the Bank was a bold and
successful early move. Overall,
Labour has accepted the
importance of competitive
markets and labour market
flexibility for economic success. 
Second, Labour has
significantly raised tax as a 
share of national income and
spent the money on public
services. ‘Tax and spend’ is
exactly what socialist governments are supposed to do,
of course, but unlike previous Labour governments,
neither Blair nor Brown have boasted about it. Nor have
they overspent in the early years of power only to be
forced by circumstances to cut back and increase taxes in
later years (as happened most notoriously in 1976 when
the then Labour Chancellor, Denis Healey, had to turn to
the International Monetary Fund).
The government’s problem is that the public expects
greater improvements in hospitals, schools and policing
from their tax pounds than they have seen. It also
remains to be seen if the increased complexity of the tax
system – coupled with more labour market regulation –
could undermine long-term growth.
Third, unlike the 1980s, the long growth period has not
been accompanied by rapidly growing inequality. There
has been a panoply of redistributive policies such as the
National Minimum Wage and tax credits for the low
paid, which have reduced poverty, especially for working
families. But although inequality in the bottom half of
the income distribution has narrowed, inequality at the
top has continued to widen.
On the left, this has led to
pressures for more aggressive
redistribution.
Blair leaves behind an
economy in better shape than
any previous Labour leader. But
will the voters give his
successor, the man who has
overseen the current
prosperity, the benefit of the
doubt when the next recession
comes? At the moment it
looks unlikely.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP and
professor of economics at LSE.
Blair’s economic legacy
Brown has overseen the current
prosperity – the question is how
voters will treat him when the
next recession comes
Blair leaves behind 
an economy in better
shape than any previous
Labour leader
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